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Abstract	  This	  paper	  distinguishes	  between	  three	  methodologies	  for	  thinking	  about	  justice:	  principle-­‐based,	  model-­‐based	  and	  ‘realist’,	  concentrating	  mainly	  on	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  Kirst	  two.	  	  Both	  model-­‐based	  and	  realist	  approaches	  pride	  themselves	  on	  taking	  institutions	  seriously	  and	  argue	  that	  institutions	  make	  a	  fundamental	  difference	  to	  justice.	  This	  claim	  is	  at	  best	  not	  proven,	  and	  it	  may	  be	  possible	  to	  account	  for	  the	  difference	  that	  institutions	  make	  to	  what	  justice	  requires	  whilst	  retaining	  a	  non-­‐institutional	  account	  of	  what	  justice	  is.	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Introduc0on 	  1
It	  is	  understandable	  that	  political	  theorists	  and	  political	  philosophers	  aspire	  to	  ‘relevance’,	  whatever	  that	  is.	  After	  all,	  what	  is	  the	  point	  of	  abstract	  theorising	  about	  politics,	  of	  all	  things,	  if	  that	  theorising	  is	  not	  to	  some	  purpose?	  What	  is	  the	  point	  of	  a	  
	  I	  should	  like	  to	  thank	  Joanna	  Burch-­‐Brown	  and	  two	  anonymous	  referees	  for	  comments.1
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theory	  of	  justice,	  if	  it	  has	  no	  purchase	  on	  the	  ‘real	  world’ and	  has	  no	  chance	  of	  being	  put	  into	  practice?	  Many	  political	  philosophers	  were	  drawn	  to	  the	  subject	  by	  an	  interest	  in	  and	  a	  commitment	  to	  making	  the	  world	  a	  better	  place,	  and	  it	  can	  be	  hard	  to	  see	  that	  pure	  theory,	  disconnected	  as	  it	  is	  from	  the	  concerns	  of	  politicians	  and	  the	  exigencies	  of	  policy,	  contributes	  to	  the	  very	  goal	  that	  motivated	  us	  in	  the	  Kirst	  place.	  There	  are	  therefore	  all	  kinds	  of	  reasons	  why	  political	  philosophers	  should	  be	  drawn	  towards	  ‘relevance’,	  to	  ‘realism’,	  and	  to	  ‘non-­‐ideal	  theory’.	  However,	  this	  desire	  for	  relevance	  should	  not	  and	  cannot	  affect	  the	  truth	  of	  matters	  involving	  the	  relationship	  between	  practice	  and	  value,	  between	  facts	  and	  principles,	  between	  reality	  and	  utopia.	  Those	  are	  truths	  (if	  there	  are	  truths	  to	  be	  had)	  come	  what	  may,	  and	  the	  wishes,	  aspirations	  and	  anxieties	  of	  theorists	  and	  philosophers	  cannot	  alter	  them.	  It	  is	  our	  job	  to	  discover	  what	  they	  are,	  and	  our	  task	  should	  not	  be	  inKluenced	  by	  wishing	  they	  were	  otherwise.	  
This	  paper	  aims	  to	  map	  some	  of	  the	  conceptual	  space	  in	  the	  debate	  between	  so-­‐called	  realists	  and	  moralists	  and	  around	  ideal	  and	  non-­‐ideal	  theory.	  It	  argues	  that	  one	  important	  distinction	  is	  not	  between	  realists	  and	  moralists	  but	  within	  the	  moralist	  camp.	  It	  is	  a	  distinction	  between,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  theories	  that	  purport	  to	  take	  political	  institutions	  seriously	  and	  which	  claim	  that	  their	  existence	  makes	  a	  fundamental	  normative	  difference	  and,	  on	  the	  other,	  theories	  that	  see	  the	  basic	  principles	  of	  justice	  as	  being,	  in	  some	  sense,	  prior	  to	  institutions	  (even	  if	  institutions	  can,	  by	  their	  existence,	  change	  what	  justice	  requires).	  Those	  ‘moralist’ theorists	  who	  concur	  with	  the	  realists	  that	  institutions	  make	  a	  fundamental	  normative	  difference	  typically	  employ	  models	  of	  the	  just	  society	  – so-­‐called	  ‘ideal	  theory’ – in	  ways	  that	  are	  constitutive	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  justice	  they	  think	  ought	  to	  obtain.	  By	  contrast,	  other	  ‘moralist’ theorists	  attribute	  no	  such	  constitutive	  role	  to	  models	  and	  seek	  to	  investigate	  what	  pre-­‐institutional	  principles	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of	  justice	  and	  other	  rights	  and	  powers	  of	  individuals	  require,	  given	  the	  way	  the	  world	  contingently	  is.	  The	  use	  of	  idealising	  models,	  slightly	  paradoxically,	  makes	  moralist	  model-­‐theorists	  in	  some	  sense	  less	  ‘realistic’ than	  their	  principle-­‐based	  rivals,	  given	  that	  the	  latter	  have	  no	  need	  to	  consider	  what	  might	  be	  required	  under	  idealised	  counterfactual	  conditions	  in	  order	  to	  address	  what	  justice	  requires	  in	  the	  actual	  world.	  The	  paper	  also	  suggests,	  provocatively,	  that	  idealised	  models	  risk	  serving	  as	  ideological	  alibis	  for	  policies	  that	  are	  actually	  unjustiKied.	  
Three	  diﬀerent	  methodological	  approaches	  
In	  the	  literature	  on	  justice	  generally,	  and,	  by	  extension	  on	  global	  justice,	  we	  can	  distinguish	  three	  broad	  types	  of	  view	  concerning	  how	  we	  should	  go	  about	  doing	  our	  thinking	  on	  the	  issue. 	  First,	  there	  are	  theories	  based	  on	  the	  application	  of	  general	  moral	  2principles	  to	  particular	  subjects.	  These	  can	  be	  of	  simple	  form,	  such	  as,	  say,	  act	  utilitarianism,	  or	  they	  can	  invoke	  a	  plurality	  of	  normative	  principles.	  Second,	  there	  are	  theories	  where	  an	  ideal	  model	  of	  society	  plays	  some	  kind	  of	  constitutive	  role	  in	  establishing	  what	  the	  relevant	  duties	  and	  obligations	  are.	  Both	  of	  these	  theories	  are	  ‘moralist’ theories	  in	  a	  sense	  employed	  by	  a	  third	  group	  of	  theorists	  who	  deem	  themselves	  ‘realists’ and	  who	  claim	  that	  the	  political	  realm	  generates	  normative	  standards	  that	  are	  entirely	  sui	  generis.	  I	  shall	  refer	  to	  the	  Kirst	  group	  as	  ‘principle-­‐based’,	  the	  second	  as	  ‘model-­‐based’ and	  the	  third	  as	  ‘realist’.	  Both	  principle-­‐based	  and	  model-­‐based	  approaches	  are	  ‘moralist’ views,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  realists,	  and	  both	  model-­‐based	  and	  realist	  approaches	  take	  themselves	  to	  be ‘more	  realist’ views	  
Note	  that	  there	  are	  some	  arbitrary	  elements	  to	  this	  classiKication	  and	  that	  other	  people,	  2for	  whatever	  reasons,	  would	  probably	  chop	  things	  up	  differently.
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compared	  to	  the	  principle-­‐based	  one,	  since	  they	  hold	  that	  facts	  about	  the	  way	  the	  world	  is	  are	  at	  least	  partly	  constitutive	  of	  basic	  normative	  principles	  for	  that	  world. 	  3
By	  ‘principle-­‐based’ theories,	  I	  intend	  to	  denote	  those	  moral	  and	  political	  theories	  that	  conceive	  of	  normative	  political	  theory	  as	  consisting	  in	  the	  application	  of	  some	  principle	  or	  or	  principles	  to	  a	  particular	  subject,	  the	  social	  and	  political	  order,	  where	  those	  principles	  in	  some	  sense	  hold	  independently	  of	  that	  particular	  social	  and	  political	  order.	  By	  ‘application’ I	  intend	  quite	  a	  broad	  set	  of	  possible	  relations,	  which	  may	  include	  the	  idea	  that,	  say,	  some	  political	  institution	  or	  other	  is	  necessary	  to	  further	  the	  realisation	  of	  some	  value,	  that	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  respect	  some	  value,	  that	  it	  is	  permissible	  according	  to	  some	  value,	  and	  so	  on.	  By	  ‘hold	  independently’ I	  mean	  only	  to	  assert	  their	  non-­‐dependence	  on	  those	  particular	  contingent	  facts	  or	  institutions;	  I	  do	  not	  mean	  to	  assert	  the	  truth	  of	  moral	  realism,	  leaving	  those	  deeper	  metaethical	  issues	  unaddressed	  and	  unresolved.	  I	  therefore	  rely	  on	  the	  manifest	  appearance	  of	  the	  moral	  in	  folk-­‐conceptions	  of	  it,	  without	  prejudice	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  those	  folk-­‐conceptions	  are	  in	  error.	  The	  church	  of	  ‘principle-­‐based’ views	  is	  a	  broad	  one:	  it	  includes	  both	  consequentialisms	  and	  TM	  Scanlon’s	  contractualism,	  the	  deontological	  libertarianism	  of	  Nozick	  and	  the	  perfectionist	  liberalism	  of	  Raz,	  it	  includes	  most	  versions	  of	  luck	  egalitarianism	  and	  the	  radical	  pluralism	  of	  GA	  Cohen,	  and	  many	  other	  views	  besides. 	  4
I	  shall	  comparatively	  little	  in	  this	  paper	  about	  the	  school	  that	  calls	  itself	  ‘realist’ in	  this	  3paper,	  for	  example,	  Galston	  (2010),	  Rossi	  (2012;	  Rossi	  and	  Sleat	  2014).	  mainly	  because	  I	  Kind	  their	  claims	  about	  sui	  generis	  principles	  for	  politics	  obscure	  and	  hard	  to	  understand,	  no	  doubt	  the	  failure	  is	  mine.	  Most	  of	  the	  discussion,	  then,	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  contrast	  between	  (some)	  principle-­‐based	  theories	  and	  model-­‐based	  theories.Scanlon	  (1998),Nozick	  (1974),	  Raz	  (1986),	  Cohen	  (2008).4
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Both	  the	  ‘realist’ theorists	  and	  those	  ‘moralists’ who	  employ	  models	  think	  that	  the	  practice	  of	  institutions	  in	  the	  actual	  world	  has	  some	  kind	  of	  constitutive	  signiKicance	  for	  the	  kinds	  of	  normative	  principle	  that	  hold.	  The	  model-­‐theorists,	  following	  Rawls, 	  5standardly	  proceed	  by	  testing	  their	  ideas	  against	  a	  ‘realistic	  utopia’ or	  ‘well-­‐ordered	  society’.	  In	  effect,	  this	  is	  a	  speciKic	  kind	  of	  thought	  experiment,	  asking	  whether	  a	  set	  of	  principles	  would	  be	  functional	  and	  stable	  in	  an	  imaginary	  society	  whose	  citizens	  were	  committed	  to	  those	  principles	  and	  hence	  motivated	  to	  comply	  with	  them.	  These	  imaginary	  societies	  are	  like	  ours	  in	  recognisable	  respects,	  containing	  similar	  institutions	  (markets,	  legal	  systems,	  systems	  of	  political	  representation)	  but	  have	  been	  adjusted	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  normative	  theorising.	  These	  shifts	  from	  reality	  are	  in	  two	  respects:	  Kirst,	  unlike	  most	  actual	  societies,	  the	  hypothetical	  societies	  in	  these	  models	  are	  actually	  trying	  to	  realise	  normative	  principles	  and	  second,	  they	  have	  been	  cleansed	  of	  citizens	  with	  an	  insufKicient	  commitment	  to	  the	  principles	  in	  questions	  and	  are	  now	  peopled	  with	  committed	  citizens	  who	  yet	  still	  have	  ‘realistic’ constraints	  on	  the	  balance	  between	  their	  own	  self-­‐interest	  and	  the	  realisation	  of	  justice.	  These	  hypothetical	  citizens	  are	  not	  expected	  to	  make	  extraordinary	  sacriKices. 	  6
A	  number	  of	  interesting	  questions	  arise	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  these	  models	  of	  ‘realistic	  utopia’ and	  the	  actual	  world.	  The	  most	  obvious	  of	  these	  concerns	  the	  applicability	  of	  principles	  that	  hold	  in	  the	  model	  society	  to	  actual	  societies,	  an	  issue	  to	  which	  I	  return	  below.	  But	  the	  normative	  Kit	  works	  in	  both	  directions:	  not	  only	  do	  the	  prescriptions	  obtained	  in	  the	  ideal	  model	  have	  signiKicance	  for	  the	  actual	  world,	  the	  
Rawls	  (1999a),	  Rawls	  (1999b).5Of	  course,	  I	  recognize	  that	  the	  test	  of	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society,	  or	  realistic	  utopia,	  is	  only	  6one	  part	  of	  Rawls’s	  constructivist	  methodology	  along	  with	  other	  elements	  such	  as	  the	  original	  position	  and	  our	  considered	  judgements.
 5
values	  that	  explored	  in	  that	  model	  also	  have	  their	  source	  in	  the	  values	  and	  practices	  of	  particular	  institutions.	  Although	  this	  was	  less	  obvious	  in,	  say,	  Rawls’s	  early	  work	  such	  as	  
A	  Theory	  of	  Justice,	  his	  later	  work	  on	  public	  reason	  disclosed	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  source	  of	  the	  values	  worked	  up	  and	  cleansed	  for	  the	  idea	  model	  was	  to	  be	  found	  in	  values	  implicit	  in	  the	  practices	  and	  history	  of	  actual	  liberal	  democracies,	  such	  as	  the	  United	  States. 	  The	  7realistic	  utopia,	  then,	  also	  functions	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  mirror,	  in	  which	  we	  see	  our	  societies	  as	  they	  would	  be,	  if	  only	  they	  were	  true	  to	  their	  own	  supposed	  values,	  whilst	  being	  divested	  of	  other	  values	  that	  are	  empirically	  present	  in	  them	  but	  which	  the	  philosopher	  deems	  irrelevant	  or	  undesirable	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  justice.	  This	  move,	  based	  as	  it	  is	  on	  a	  moral	  interpretation	  of	  existing	  practices,	  is	  open	  to	  emulation	  for	  a	  range	  of	  different	  subjects.	  So	  we	  can	  ask	  not	  only	  about	  the	  values	  supposedly	  embedded	  in,	  say,	  liberal	  democracies,	  but	  also	  about	  the	  values	  embedded	  in	  the	  international	  order,	  the	  system	  of	  global	  economic	  institutions,	  and	  so	  forth.	  Some	  model-­‐based	  theories	  accentuate	  this	  interpretive	  aspect	  more	  than	  others,	  but	  it	  is	  clearly	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  family	  of	  approaches	  that	  goes	  under	  the	  label	  ‘practice	  dependence’ and	  gives	  those	  approaches	  a	  slightly	  relativistic	  Klavour. 	  8
It	  is	  primarily	  within	  these	  model-­‐based	  approaches	  that	  the	  contrast	  between	  ideal	  and	  non-­‐ideal	  theory	  becomes	  an	  issue.	  SpeciKically,	  the	  question	  arises	  of	  how	  the	  principles	  that	  are	  generated	  for	  the	  realistic	  utopia	  (ideal	  theory)	  have	  relevance	  and	  application	  in	  the	  real	  world,	  where	  the	  constitutive	  assumptions	  of	  that	  realistic	  utopia	  do	  not	  obtain	  (non-­‐ideal	  theory).	  One	  answer	  to	  that	  question	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  realistic	  utopia	  deKines	  a	  standard	  that	  can	  orient	  us	  in	  the	  actual	  world	  and	  that	  the	  work	  of	  
See	  Rawls	  (1993),	  especially,	  ‘Justice	  as	  Fairness:	  Political	  not	  Metaphysical’.7e.g	  Sangiovanni	  (2007),	  Sangiovanni	  (2008),	  Ronzoni	  (2009),	  James	  (2013).8
 6
people	  who	  are	  committed	  to	  justice	  must	  be	  to	  work	  out	  ways	  to	  effect	  a	  transition	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  society	  deKined	  by	  the	  realistic	  utopia.	  One	  kind	  of	  non-­‐ideal	  theory,	  then,	  is	  concerned	  with	  this	  problem	  of	  transition. 	  Some	  of	  Rawls’s	  writing	  on	  non-­‐ideal	  theory	  9seems	  to	  have	  this	  character,	  as	  when	  he	  is	  writing	  of	  the	  terms	  of	  settlement	  of	  a	  just	  war	  and	  does	  this	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  coexistence	  of	  reasonable	  peoples	  in	  mind,	  but	  at	  other	  times,	  say	  when	  endorsing	  ius	  in	  bello	  prohibitions,	  it	  is	  far	  from	  clear	  that	  the	  ideal	  model	  is	  playing	  much	  of	  a	  role.	  The	  difKiculty,	  though,	  with	  looking	  on	  the	  realistic	  utopia	  as	  an	  ideal	  and	  seeing	  the	  goal	  of	  non-­‐ideal	  theory	  as	  being	  about	  the	  strategy	  and	  tactics	  of	  transition	  to	  it	  is	  that	  it	  isn’t	  at	  all	  clear	  how	  that	  task	  relates	  to	  making	  the	  actual	  world	  more	  or	  less	  unjust.	  When	  thinking	  about	  tax	  policy,	  for	  example,	  should	  we	  be	  trying	  to	  reform	  it	  so	  it	  is	  more	  like	  the	  tax	  policy	  that	  would	  obtain	  in	  a	  realistic	  utopia?	  Or	  does	  justice	  require	  something	  else,	  perhaps	  something	  more	  pragmatic	  that	  looks	  to	  incremental	  improvements	  without	  such	  a	  goal	  as	  a	  standard?	  	  
The	  use	  of	  a	  hypothetical	  model	  of	  society	  does	  not,	  in	  itself,	  mark	  a	  distinction	  between	  model-­‐based	  and	  principle-­‐based	  theories.	  The	  important	  thing	  to	  note	  is	  that	  the	  two	  approaches	  employ	  such	  models	  in	  different	  ways.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  we	  can	  use	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  hypothetical	  society	  as	  a	  purely	  epistemic	  device,	  where	  we	  think	  about	  how	  an	  ideal	  family,	  or	  society,	  or	  international	  system	  could	  work	  can	  be	  a	  way	  of	  testing	  our	  principles	  and	  working	  out	  what	  our	  fundamental	  values	  actually	  are. 	  This	  is	  basically	  10nothing	  more	  that	  the	  old	  philosophical	  method	  of	  examining	  superKicially	  plausible	  principles	  in	  the	  light	  of	  counterexamples	  and	  being	  willing	  to	  revise	  them	  if	  they	  appear	  to	  yield	  unacceptable	  counterexamples.	  For	  example,	  the	  fact	  that	  act	  
This	  is	  the	  approach	  found	  in	  Simmons	  (2010).9 It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  this	  sort	  of	  use	  of	  ideal	  theory	  is	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  Stemplowska	  10(2008)	  and	  Swift	  (2008).
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utilitarianism	  appears	  to	  sanction	  the	  exemplary	  execution	  of	  the	  innocent	  counts	  against	  it,	  thus	  forcing	  us	  to	  revise	  or	  abandon	  the	  principle	  or,	  if	  we	  are	  feeling	  very	  brave,	  to	  ‘bite	  the	  bullet’.	  Many	  people	  engaged	  in	  ‘ideal	  theory’ are	  therefore	  best	  seen	  as	  principle-­‐based	  theorists	  engaged	  in	  testing	  and	  reKining	  their	  principles	  using	  hypothetical	  examples.	  But	  for	  them	  those	  principles	  don’t	  depend	  constitutively	  or	  ontologically	  on	  those	  models	  or	  thought	  experiments.	  The	  theorist	  whom	  I	  designate	  as	  model-­‐theorists,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  assign	  not	  just	  an	  epistemic	  but	  also	  a	  constitutive	  role	  to	  models:	  for	  them,	  part	  of	  what	  makes	  a	  valid	  principle	  a	  valid	  principle	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  would	  be	  implemented	  and	  respected	  in	  the	  well-­‐ordered	  counterpart	  to	  the	  institutions	  under	  investigation.	  
According	  to	  their	  protagonists,	  both	  realist	  and	  model-­‐based	  theorists	  take	  institutions	  seriously	  in	  ways	  that	  principle-­‐based	  theories	  do	  not.	  What	  this	  means	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  is	  true	  is	  explored	  below,	  but	  Kirst	  I	  need	  to	  introduce	  some	  further	  context	  concerning	  the	  global	  justice	  debate.	  
The	  ‘global	  jus0ce’ debate:	  an	  outline	  of	  the	  territory	  
To	  get	  some	  traction	  on	  these	  methodological	  issues	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  ‘global	  justice’ debate,	  I	  need	  to	  say	  something	  about	  that	  debate,	  which	  has	  proceeded	  in	  the	  normal	  way,	  that	  is	  is	  by	  a	  proliferation	  of	  positions	  and	  stances,	  each	  one	  subtly	  different	  from	  the	  next.	  However,	  at	  least	  within	  the	  camp	  of	  people	  who	  think	  of	  themselves	  as	  roughly	  egalitarian	  and	  liberal,	  we	  can	  distinguish	  three	  broad	  families	  of	  views,	  differentiated	  along	  two	  different	  dimensions. 	  First,	  there	  is	  distinction	  between	  so-­‐11
This	  classiKication	  basically	  derives	  from	  Sangiovanni	  (2007).11
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called	  relational	  and	  non-­‐relational	  views,	  that	  is	  between	  views	  that	  hold	  that	  strong	  duties	  of	  distributive	  justice	  apply	  to	  people	  who	  stand	  in	  some	  speciKic	  kind	  of	  relation	  to	  one	  another,	  and	  those	  who	  hold	  that	  such	  duties	  apply	  to	  all	  human	  beings	  (or	  even	  all	  persons,	  if	  there	  are	  non-­‐human	  persons)	  in	  virtue	  of	  their	  common	  humanity	  or	  personhood.	  Among	  so-­‐called	  relational	  views,	  there	  is	  wide	  disagreement	  about	  the	  kinds	  of	  relationship	  or	  association	  that	  trigger	  distributive	  justice	  duties	  and	  much	  of	  the	  micro-­‐differentiation	  of	  theories	  Klows	  from	  differences	  on	  this	  question.	  Second,	  there	  is	  the	  dimension	  of	  scope.	  Since	  non-­‐relational	  views	  hold	  among	  persons	  generally,	  and	  there	  are	  persons	  all	  over	  the	  planet,	  it	  follows	  that	  non-­‐relational	  theories	  have	  global	  scope. 	  For	  relational	  views,	  by	  contrast,	  the	  key	  question	  is	  12whether	  the	  supposed	  distributive-­‐justice	  triggering	  condition	  holds	  globally	  or	  merely	  locally.	  Theorists	  who	  hold	  that	  productive	  co-­‐operation	  via	  a	  division	  of	  labour	  is	  the	  correct	  triggering	  condition	  can	  point	  to	  the	  fact	  of	  globalisation	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  global	  division	  of	  labour;	  those	  whose	  claim	  picks	  out	  some	  more	  local	  condition,	  such	  as	  subjection	  to	  a	  common	  political	  authority,	  will	  favour	  a	  theory	  with	  narrower	  scope,	  arguing	  perhaps	  that	  strong	  egalitarian	  duties	  hold	  only	  among	  co-­‐citizens	  or	  residents	  of	  particular	  states.	  
Notice	  that	  hybrid	  views	  of	  various	  kinds	  are	  possible	  and	  even	  common.	  So,	  for	  example,	  some	  relational	  views	  support	  egalitarian	  duties	  of	  graduated	  strength,	  depending	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  ties	  in	  question,	  so	  that	  more	  equality	  is	  required	  among	  co-­‐citizens	  than	  with	  foreign	  co-­‐operators,	  but	  where	  there	  is	  some	  egalitarian	  normative	  pressure	  to	  reduce	  inequalities	  with	  those	  foreign	  co-­‐operators,	  although	  not	  
In	  fact,	  if	  duties	  are	  among	  persons	  and	  there	  are	  non-­‐human	  persons,	  potentially	  12literally	  universal	  scope!
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by	  as	  much. 	  Similarly,	  those	  committed	  to	  strong	  egalitarian	  duties	  within	  states	  often	  13concede	  that	  there	  are	  humanitarian	  duties	  of	  assistance	  to	  destitute	  outsiders,	  quibbling	  perhaps	  over	  whether	  those	  humanitarian	  duties	  count	  as	  duties	  of	  justice	  in	  some	  proper	  sense	  of	  that	  word.	  They	  thereby	  include	  within	  their	  theory	  of	  global	  justice	  a	  recognition	  of	  some	  non-­‐relational	  grounds	  of	  justice	  and	  use	  that	  to	  justify	  a	  sufKicientarian	  duty.	  
Early	  incarnations	  of	  the	  global	  justice	  debate	  often	  couched	  the	  disagreement	  between	  people	  who	  contended	  that	  principles	  of	  distributive	  justice	  ought	  to	  have	  global	  scope	  and	  those	  who	  thought	  that	  egalitarian	  duties	  held	  mainly	  among	  compatriots	  (for	  example)	  as	  a	  disagreement	  between	  cosmopolitans	  and	  nationalists.	  But	  this	  way	  of	  expressing	  the	  disagreement	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  controversial	  because	  it	  appeared	  to	  suggest	  that	  ‘nationalists’ were	  committed	  to	  a	  thesis	  about	  the	  comparative	  intrinsic	  worth	  of	  human	  beings,	  to	  the	  view	  that	  some	  people	  matter	  more	  than	  others.	  In	  fact,	  all	  theorists	  who	  are	  broadly	  in	  the	  egalitarian	  liberal	  ‘family’ of	  views	  are	  committed	  to	  an	  egalitarian	  thesis	  about	  the	  moral	  status	  of	  all	  human	  beings.	  Given	  this	  commitment,	  and	  their	  parallel	  commitment	  to	  some	  egalitarian	  view	  or	  other	  about	  distribution,	  it	  follows	  that	  those	  who	  favour	  giving	  principles	  of	  distributive	  justice	  limited	  scope	  face	  a	  puzzle	  about	  how	  they	  can	  both	  afKirm	  the	  equal	  worth	  of	  persons	  and	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  morally	  permitted	  (indeed	  required)	  for	  some	  people	  or	  institutions	  to	  show	  greater	  concern	  for	  the	  interests	  of	  some	  of	  those	  persons	  than	  for	  others.	  Hence	  the	  requirement	  for	  theorists	  who	  want	  to	  limit	  the	  scope	  of	  distributive	  principles	  to	  invoke	  some	  associative	  or	  relational	  reason	  that	  justiKies	  this	  discrimination	  in	  favour	  of	  ‘insiders’.	  	  
Perhaps	  an	  example	  of	  this	  is	  Cohen	  and	  Sabel	  (2006).13
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Relational	  views	  come	  in	  a	  number	  of	  different	  Klavours.	  Prominent	  among	  them	  are	  theories	  that	  stress	  the	  importance	  of	  states	  or	  peoples	  as	  self-­‐determining	  collectives	  that	  must	  take	  responsibility	  for	  their	  choices	  (for	  good	  or	  ill);	  theories	  that	  claim	  that	  the	  key	  triggering	  factor	  is	  when	  people	  impose	  a	  framework	  of	  coercive	  law	  with	  distributive	  implications	  on	  one	  another;	  and	  theories	  which	  claim	  that	  when	  people	  co-­‐operate	  closely	  in	  the	  production	  of	  a	  limited	  range	  of	  important	  collective	  goods	  under	  some	  co-­‐ordinating	  authority,	  this	  gives	  rise	  to	  egalitarian	  obligations	  that	  don’t	  otherwise	  exist.	  Though	  such	  theories	  vary	  importantly	  in	  their	  details,	  they	  all	  share	  a	  commitment	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  institutions	  make	  a	  difference	  and	  that	  the	  importance	  of	  institutions	  for	  distributive	  justice	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  being	  instruments	  for	  the	  realisation	  of	  some	  antecedently	  given	  moral	  principle,	  but	  that	  by	  their	  existence	  and	  practice,	  they	  generate	  a	  new	  set	  of	  duties	  that	  were	  not	  around	  before.	  Moral	  argument	  around	  such	  institutions	  has	  both	  an	  inside	  and	  an	  outside.	  We	  can	  ask	  about	  the	  justiKication	  of	  the	  institution	  as	  a	  whole,	  whether	  it	  realises	  certain	  important	  human	  goods,	  refrains	  from	  imposing	  signiKicant	  harms	  etc.	  We	  can	  also	  ask	  about	  the	  internal	  norms	  that	  constitute	  it	  and	  bind	  its	  constituent	  parts,	  be	  they	  institutions	  or	  persons.	  Sometimes	  those	  internal	  norms	  will	  be	  explicit	  terms	  of	  association	  of	  the	  collective	  in	  question,	  sometimes	  they	  will	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  its	  custom	  and	  practice,	  and	  sometimes	  our	  more	  critical	  focus	  will	  be	  on	  revising	  norms	  and	  practices	  better	  to	  Kit	  in	  with	  what	  we	  take	  the	  meaning	  and	  moral	  purpose	  of	  the	  relationship,	  association	  or	  institution	  to	  be.	  
How	  does	  the	  classiKication	  of	  global	  justice	  views	  relate	  to	  the	  distinction	  among	  methodological	  approaches	  that	  I	  outlined	  in	  the	  previous	  section?	  Whilst	  there	  may	  be	  some	  cases	  which	  are	  not	  easy	  to	  classify,	  as	  a	  rough	  generalisation,	  non-­‐relational	  globalist	  views	  about	  justice	  are	  instances	  of	  principle-­‐based	  views,	  whereas	  relational	  views	  which	  restrict	  the	  scope	  of	  distributive	  justice	  to	  some	  group,	  entity	  or	  set	  of	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institutions	  tend	  to	  be	  model-­‐based	  views.	  All	  of	  these	  views	  are,	  in	  they	  eyes	  of	  ‘realists’,	  such	  as	  Galston	  or	  Rossi,	  moralistic.	  The	  key	  divide	  here,	  at	  least	  in	  they	  eyes	  of	  those	  advancing	  it,	  is	  that	  institutions	  make	  a	  difference	  to	  what	  is	  normatively	  required.	  It	  is	  going	  to	  be	  crucial,	  then,	  to	  see	  whether	  those	  accused	  of	  denying	  the	  normative	  signiKicance	  of	  institutions	  do	  (or	  need)	  deny	  it,	  or	  whether	  they	  also	  can	  account	  for	  that	  putative	  signiKicance	  within	  their	  own	  approach.	  
The	  ‘ins0tu0ons-­‐make-­‐a-­‐diﬀerence’ thesis	  
The	  claim	  that	  ‘realists’ think	  distinguishes	  them	  from	  moralists	  and	  which	  model-­‐based	  theorists	  (including	  Kantian	  justice	  and	  practice-­‐dependence	  theorists)	  in	  turn	  believe	  distinguishes	  them	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  moral	  views	  is,	  then,	  the	  institutions-­‐make-­‐a-­‐difference	  thesis,	  the	  thesis	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  and	  participation	  in	  a	  system	  of	  rule-­‐governed	  practices	  of	  some	  kind	  makes	  a	  really	  big	  difference	  to	  the	  normative	  principles	  that	  apply.	  
William	  Galston	  has	  a	  typical	  statement	  of	  this	  kind	  when	  he	  writes:	  
Poli%cal	  moralists,	  … tend	  to	  view	  ins%tu%ons	  simply	  as	  means	  for	  the	  realiza%on	  of	  antecedently	  established	  
principles	  and	  aims.	  To	  be	  sure,	  there	  is	  something	  to	  this	  means/ends	  thesis:	  a	  ﬂat-­‐footed	  reading	  of	  the	  
Declara%on	  of	  Independence	  (‘to	  secure	  these	  rights’)	  or	  of	  the	  Cons%tu%on	  (‘in	  order	  to’)	  tends	  to	  support	  it.	  
But,	  say	  the	  realists,	  there	  is	  much	  more	  to	  ins%tu%ons	  than	  their	  instrumental	  func%on. 	  14
In	  similar	  vein,	  Samuel	  Freeman,	  who	  is	  in	  Galston’s	  terms	  a	  ‘political	  moralist’ writes:	  
Galston	  (2010),	  p.	  393.14
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[C]osmopolitans	  do	  not	  recognize	  that	  there	  are	  dis%nct	  and	  independent	  principles	  of	  social	  and	  poli%cal	  
jus%ce	  ….	  Social	  principles	  of	  jus%ce,	  if	  they	  exist	  at	  all,	  are	  deriva%ve	  from	  allegedly	  more	  basic	  principles	  of	  
cosmopolitan	  jus%ce. 	  15
Where	  this	  claim	  is	  made	  by	  model-­‐based	  theorists	  and	  is	  applied	  to	  reasons	  of	  justice,	  it	  has	  one	  of	  its	  modern	  sources	  in	  Rawls’s	  A	  Theory	  of	  Justice	  and	  comes	  in	  strong	  and	  weak	  forms.	  The	  strong	  form	  claims	  that	  institutions	  of	  some	  kind	  are	  an	  existence-­‐	  or	  applicability-­‐condition	  for	  claims	  of	  justice;	  the	  weak	  form	  claims	  that	  institutions	  create	  reasons	  of	  justice	  which	  were	  not	  there	  before,	  but	  which	  may	  coexist	  or	  supplement	  some	  other	  reasons	  of	  justice.	  
Strong	  and	  weak	  forms	  of	  the	  ins0tu0onal-­‐thesis	  
Right	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  A	  Theory	  of	  Justice,	  John	  Rawls	  tells	  us	  that	  ‘justice	  is	  the	  Kirst	  virtue	  of	  social	  institutions.’ 	  The	  natural	  way	  to	  read	  his	  statement	  is	  simply	  as	  a	  16declaration	  that	  justice	  is	  of	  paramount	  importance	  for	  social	  institutions.	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  a	  rather	  extreme	  declaration	  of	  that	  importance,	  given	  that	  Rawls	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  allow	  that	  the	  virtue	  of	  justice	  be	  compromised,	  for	  institutions,	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  value	  of	  other	  things	  like	  well-­‐being	  or	  efKiciency.	  What	  Rawls	  does	  not	  say	  in	  that	  famous	  passage	  is	  that	  justice	  only	  applies	  within	  institutions,	  that	  is	  it	  in	  some	  constitutive	  sense	  an	  institutional	  virtue.	  Indeed,	  he	  leaves	  open	  the	  possibility	  that	  justice,	  as	  a	  virtue,	  applies	  to	  other	  contexts	  and	  subjects,	  including	  extra-­‐institutional	  ones.	  It	  is	  not,	  then,	  ‘justice’ that	  is	  constitutively	  limited	  to	  institutional	  contexts,	  but,	  at	  
Freeman	  (2007a),	  p.	  423.15Rawls	  (1999a),	  p.1.16
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most	  ‘Rawlsian	  justice’,	  a	  subset	  of	  justice,	  worked	  through	  for	  a	  particular	  subject,	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  society.	  
One	  reason	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  draw	  attention	  to	  this	  is	  that	  some	  subsequent	  writers	  in	  the	  Rawlsian	  tradition	  have	  argued	  as	  if	  justice	  does	  indeed	  only	  come	  to	  apply	  as	  a	  virtue	  within	  institutions	  of	  a	  speciKic	  type.	  For	  example,	  Thomas	  Nagel,	  in	  his	  well	  known	  article	  on	  global	  justice, 	  argues	  that	  justice,	  properly-­‐speaking,	  only	  comes	  into	  17being	  subsequent	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  political	  authority.	  For	  Nagel,	  it	  is	  only	  when	  a	  state,	  guaranteeing	  social	  order,	  holding	  back	  the	  bellum	  omnia	  contra	  omnes,	  and	  securing	  co-­‐operation	  in	  the	  production	  of	  key	  public	  goods,	  is	  established,	  that	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  talk	  about	  justice	  at	  all.	  In	  similar	  vein	  Samuel	  Freeman,	  criticising	  attempts	  by	  cosmopolitans	  and	  others	  to	  specify	  principles	  of	  justice	  independent	  of	  institutions	  argues	  that	  Rawls,	  
assumes	  that	  jus%ce	  and	  social	  coopera%on	  too	  are	  not	  possible	  without	  governments	  and	  complicated	  legal	  
systems,	  and	  that	  what	  social	  jus%ce	  involves,	  in	  large	  part,	  are	  principles	  for	  structuring	  and	  deﬁning	  the	  
powers	  of	  poli%cal	  ins%tu%ons.	  …For	  Rawls,	  our	  considered	  convic%ons	  of	  jus%ce	  arise	  within	  the	  prac%ces	  and	  
ins%tu%ons	  we	  live	  with,	  and	  are	  aUuned	  to	  the	  structure	  and	  demands	  of	  those	  ins%tu%ons. 	  18
The	  reason	  behind	  this	  claim	  derives	  historically	  from	  Kant	  (or	  from	  a	  particular	  reading	  of	  Kant,	  at	  any	  rate)	  and	  involves	  a	  rather	  restricted	  understanding	  of	  what	  justice	  is,	  taking	  it	  to	  be	  essentially	  about	  rights	  over	  property.	  Kant	  argues,	  according	  to	  this	  interpretation,	  that	  without	  the	  state	  there	  can	  be	  no	  property	  rights,	  properly	  speaking,	  and	  it	  follows	  from	  this	  that	  there	  can	  be	  no	  justice,	  or	  rather	  that	  talk	  of	  justice	  has	  neither	  sense	  nor	  application.	  Kant’s	  thought	  here	  builds	  on	  Hobbes.	  Without	  
Nagel	  (2005).17Freeman	  (2007b)	  pp.	  271–2.18
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a	  sovereign	  in	  place	  there	  can	  be	  no	  property	  rights	  because	  there	  is	  nobody	  authoritative	  to	  judge	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  extent	  and	  nature	  of	  those	  rights	  is	  indeterminate,	  and,	  second,	  without	  the	  sword	  of	  Leviathan	  in	  place,	  nobody	  can	  have	  an	  assurance	  that	  their	  possessions	  are	  secure	  against	  the	  predations	  of	  others,	  and,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  an	  assurance	  they	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  refrain	  from	  taking	  and	  using	  the	  possessions	  of	  others.	  To	  this,	  Kant	  adds	  his	  own	  distinctive	  element,	  the	  omnilateral	  will.	  To	  claim	  property	  rights	  in	  a	  state	  of	  nature	  is	  unilaterally	  to	  impose	  duties	  on	  others	  and	  this	  nobody	  has	  the	  authority	  to	  do.	  Hence	  the	  need	  to	  establish	  an	  entity	  with	  such	  an	  authority,	  an	  entity	  that	  can	  regulate	  everybody’s	  claims	  from	  an	  impartial	  perspective,	  that	  of	  an	  omnilateral	  will. 	  19
This	  very	  strong	  claim,	  that	  having	  institutions	  in	  place,	  and	  institutions	  of	  a	  particular	  type	  (namely,	  a	  state	  and	  a	  legal	  system)	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  justice	  and	  social	  co-­‐operation	  seems	  very	  unsatisfactory.	  It	  rules	  out	  by	  deKinitional	  or	  conceptual	  Kiat	  concerns	  that	  many	  people	  have	  about	  all	  kinds	  of	  issues	  that	  standardly	  get	  talked	  about	  in	  terms	  of	  justice.	  If	  we	  want	  to	  ask	  whether	  it	  is	  unfair	  that	  one	  person	  is	  wealthier	  or	  happier	  than	  another,	  through	  no	  fault	  of	  their	  own	  or	  whether	  this	  or	  that	  co-­‐operative	  arrangement	  involves	  a	  fair	  distribution	  of	  beneKits	  and	  burdens,	  it	  will	  be	  very	  frustrating	  to	  be	  told	  that	  our	  concerns	  involve	  some	  kind	  of	  category	  mistake.	  More	  plausible	  than	  the	  idea	  that	  legal	  and	  political	  institutions	  are	  an	  absolutely	  necessary	  precondition	  for	  talk	  of	  justice	  to	  have	  sense,	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  institutions	  make	  a	  difference	  to	  our	  judgements	  and	  to	  the	  applicable	  principles.	  This	  idea	  seems	  entirely	  plausible,	  but	  I	  shall	  suggest	  below	  that	  this	  weaker	  claim	  can	  be	  
Kant	  (1996),	  cf	  also	  Ripstein	  (2009)	  chapter	  6.	  For	  a	  sceptical	  take	  on	  Kant’s	  views	  on	  19property	  see	  Bertram	  (2013).
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accommodated	  by	  principle-­‐based	  theorists	  and	  need	  not,	  despite	  appearances,	  mark	  a	  distinctive	  type	  of	  view.	  
Responding	  to	  the	  ins0tu0onal	  thesis	  
There	  are	  two	  ways	  of	  responding	  to	  the	  institutional	  claim	  an	  opponent	  might	  employ.	  The	  Kirst	  is	  to	  bite	  the	  bullet	  and	  to	  deny	  that	  institutions	  make	  a	  difference	  for	  justice.	  This	  response	  demarcates	  the	  territory	  just	  as	  the	  more	  realist	  theorist	  wants,	  but	  then	  denies	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  proposition.	  The	  second	  way	  of	  responding	  is	  to	  concede	  that	  institutions	  make	  a	  difference,	  but	  to	  defuse	  the	  claim	  by	  arguing	  that	  this	  doesn’t	  threaten	  the	  opponent’s	  view	  in	  the	  way	  that	  the	  more	  realist	  theorist	  think	  that	  it	  does	  and	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  absorb	  the	  more	  realist	  view	  into	  a	  wider,	  more	  complete,	  account	  of	  justice.	  In	  other	  worlds,	  in	  afKirming	  that	  institutions	  matter,	  those	  who	  make	  this	  claim	  do	  not,	  contrary	  to	  the	  view	  they	  take	  of	  themselves,	  assert	  anything	  that	  their	  opponents	  are	  committed	  to	  denying.	  
To	  take	  the	  Kirst	  response	  Kirst	  then,	  it	  isn’t	  clear	  whether	  anyone	  ought	  to	  bite	  the	  bullet,	  but	  if	  anyone	  does	  it	  is	  some	  sort	  of	  consequentialist,	  an	  act	  utilitarian	  for	  example.	  On	  such	  a	  view,	  we	  are	  morally	  required	  to	  do	  whatever	  we	  have	  to	  do	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  best	  consequences,	  and	  institutions	  are	  valued	  or	  not	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  help	  or	  hinder	  the	  maximisation	  of	  the	  good.	  What	  we	  have	  reason	  to	  do	  is	  therefore	  fundamentally	  unaffected	  by	  the	  existence	  of	  institutions,	  though	  of	  course	  we	  have	  to	  take	  account	  of	  them,	  as	  we	  take	  account	  of	  all	  contingent	  features	  of	  the	  world,	  in	  our	  calculation	  of	  what	  we	  have	  reason	  to	  do	  at	  any	  particular	  moment.	  I	  shall	  not	  discuss	  this	  view	  further,	  both	  because	  I	  regard	  it	  as	  implausible,	  but	  also	  because,	  though	  both	  ‘realists’ and	  ‘practice	  dependence’ theorists	  may	  be	  happy	  to	  present	  it	  as	  a	  model	  of	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the	  kind	  of	  thing	  they	  are	  against	  (as	  the	  quotes	  from	  Galston	  and	  Freeman	  above	  suggest)	  	  it	  does	  not	  characterise	  accurately	  the	  position	  of	  the	  people	  who	  they	  are	  most	  obviously	  opposed	  to.	  It	  is,	  in	  other	  words,	  a	  caricature.	  
A	  weaker,	  non-­‐maximising,	  version	  of	  a	  similar	  view	  might	  be	  Robert	  Goodin’s	  ‘assigned	  general	  duties’ model	  of	  institutions. 	  On	  this	  view,	  we	  all	  have	  certain	  general	  duties	  to	  20humanity	  as	  a	  whole,	  both	  positive	  (duties	  of	  assistance,	  rescue)	  and	  negative	  (duties	  not	  to	  harm)	  and	  considerations	  of	  efKiciency	  dictate	  that	  we	  should	  assign	  these	  duties	  to	  speciKic	  associations	  that	  will	  take	  responsibility	  for	  them	  on	  our	  behalf.	  So,	  for	  example,	  we	  assign	  the	  duty	  of	  providing	  social	  order	  and	  personal	  security	  to	  particular	  states,	  who	  look	  after	  the	  interests	  of	  citizens	  and	  others	  on	  the	  territory	  they	  have	  jurisdiction	  over.	  Similarly,	  the	  general	  duty	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  interests	  and	  education	  of	  children	  is	  assigned	  to	  families	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  psychological	  attachment	  of	  parents	  to	  their	  children	  is	  the	  best	  means	  of	  getting	  the	  job	  done.	  In	  the	  case	  where	  the	  institutions	  fail	  to	  do	  what	  they	  are	  supposed	  to	  do,	  a	  residual	  duty	  then	  falls	  on	  everyone	  else.	  People	  who	  are	  persecuted	  or	  otherwise	  failed	  by	  the	  states	  to	  which	  they	  were	  assigned	  can	  seek	  protection	  from	  other	  states	  under	  the	  Refugee	  Convention,	  and	  those	  states	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  take	  them	  in;	  children	  who	  are	  neglected	  or	  abused	  by	  their	  parents	  get	  assigned	  to	  foster	  parents	  or	  children’s	  homes	  by	  the	  state.	  States	  and	  families	  on	  this	  view	  are	  essentially	  instruments	  for	  the	  discharge	  of	  general	  duties	  and	  the	  relationships	  they	  engender	  and	  make	  possible	  do	  not	  have	  free-­‐standing	  moral	  signiKicance.	  
Goodin	  (1988).20
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Principles	  of	  jus0ce	  and	  what	  they	  require	  
However,	  a	  second	  way	  of	  responding	  is	  absorb	  the	  institutional	  claim	  into	  a	  wider	  theory	  normative	  theory.	  This	  approach	  would	  accepts	  that	  institutions	  can	  make	  a	  difference	  to	  what	  justice	  requires	  (as	  opposed	  to	  what	  it	  is)	  but	  Kinds	  a	  place	  for	  that	  claim	  within	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  view	  about	  what	  ought	  to	  be	  done.	  (I	  have	  in	  mind	  here	  a	  distinction	  that	  Simon	  Caney	  makes	  between	  the	  principles	  of	  justice	  and	  what	  justice	  requires.) 	  The	  principles	  of	  justice	  here	  may	  include	  a	  variety	  of	  things,	  21perhaps	  cosmopolitan	  views	  about	  fundamental	  equality	  of	  moral	  status	  together	  with	  some	  more	  substantive	  principles	  (equality,	  priority,	  sufKiciency)	  about	  how	  some	  types	  of	  thing	  (resources,	  capability,	  welfare)	  should	  be	  distributed.	  Other	  elements	  of	  the	  picture	  would	  include	  views	  about	  the	  moral	  rights,	  powers	  and	  duties	  of	  individuals	  and	  about	  their	  capacities	  to	  act	  in	  ways	  that	  transform	  the	  moral	  landscape,	  including	  via	  the	  use	  of	  their	  moral	  powers	  to	  create	  institutions.	  In	  this	  optic,	  there	  is	  something	  misleading	  about	  model-­‐theoretic	  views,	  including	  practice-­‐dependent	  views,	  because	  they	  confuse	  what	  they	  are	  doing	  (working	  out	  what	  justice	  requires	  for	  a	  particular	  subject)	  for	  an	  investigation	  into	  the	  principles	  of	  justice	  as	  such.	  Rather,	  the	  basic	  normative	  truths	  hold	  extra-­‐institutionally,	  but	  difference	  in	  what	  justice	  requires	  can	  arise	  within	  institutions	  because	  of	  different	  circumstances	  and	  because	  individuals	  have	  contingently	  used	  their	  moral	  powers	  in	  ways	  that	  set	  up	  particular	  patterns	  of	  duty,	  obligation,	  permission,	  and	  so	  forth.	  
If	  we	  accord	  principles	  of	  justice	  and	  the	  rights	  and	  powers	  that	  people	  justly	  hold	  a	  lexical	  priority	  over	  other	  values,	  then	  this	  application	  of	  extra-­‐institutional	  moral	  elements	  will	  settle	  the	  question	  of	  what	  justice	  requires	  for	  a	  particular	  subject.	  
Caney	  (2011).21
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Alternatively,	  there	  might	  be	  a	  question	  about	  how	  these	  various	  elements	  combine	  with	  other	  values	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  judgements	  about	  what	  should	  be	  done,	  or	  what	  we	  should	  value.	  So,	  we	  might	  take	  the	  view	  that	  we	  have	  to	  compromise	  between	  justice	  and	  some	  other	  value	  such	  as	  aggregate	  well-­‐being.	  
All	  of	  this	  is	  rather	  messy,	  but	  inevitably	  so,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  point	  in	  hankering	  for	  an	  algorithm	  for	  making	  moral	  judgements	  if	  no	  such	  thing	  is	  to	  be	  had.	  What	  might	  be	  helpful,	  though,	  is	  some	  kind	  of	  illustration	  how	  this	  picture	  might	  work	  for	  global	  justice.	  Accordingly,	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  sketch	  out,	  merely	  for	  illustrative	  purposes,	  how	  this	  might	  be	  done.	  
Moral	  powers	  and	  associa0ve	  du0es	  
The	  task	  then	  is	  to	  sketch	  how	  an	  account	  of	  global	  justice	  based	  on	  preinstitutional	  moral	  principles,	  yet	  giving	  an	  account	  of	  the	  same	  moral	  phenomena	  that	  model-­‐based	  theories	  do,	  might	  go.	  	  
A	  starting	  point	  for	  such	  a	  sketch	  would	  be	  to	  assign	  shares	  of	  the	  world	  to	  individuals	  and	  also	  to	  grant	  them	  a	  plausible	  set	  of	  rights,	  duties,	  and	  moral	  powers	  permitting	  them	  to	  associate	  together	  and	  transform	  the	  moral	  landscape	  in	  various	  ways.	  Taking	  their	  initial	  resources	  and	  using	  their	  moral	  powers	  they	  might	  associate	  together,	  both	  to	  further	  their	  private	  interests	  and	  perhaps	  provide	  a	  framework	  for	  the	  more	  efKicient	  discharge	  of	  their	  general	  duties.	  Given	  their	  moral	  powers,	  they	  will	  plausibly	  acquire	  special	  duties	  of	  various	  kinds,	  including	  promissory	  and	  rectiKicatory	  duties,	  as	  they	  associate	  together,	  sometimes	  more	  or	  less	  accidentally.	  Over	  time,	  associates	  will	  come	  to	  engage	  in	  more	  or	  less	  settled	  co-­‐operative	  practices	  that	  will	  vary	  in	  contingent	  ways	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between	  different	  societies.	  Some	  will	  arrange	  their	  common	  affairs	  in	  one	  manner;	  others	  in	  another.	  
To	  say	  this	  might	  be	  to	  appear	  to	  cede	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  ground	  to	  the	  ‘realist’ or	  the	  ‘practice-­‐dependence’ theorist.	  But	  this	  appearance	  would	  be	  misleading.	  Although	  associations	  bring	  new	  relationships	  and	  obligations	  into	  being,	  they	  do	  so	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  moral	  rights	  and	  powers	  that	  their	  members	  already	  had.	  They	  may	  alter	  their	  relationship	  to	  one	  another	  in	  various	  ways	  but	  that	  association	  cannot,	  for	  example,	  change	  their	  normative	  situation	  with	  respect	  to	  outsiders,	  by	  endowing	  them	  with	  rights	  towards	  those	  outsiders	  they	  formerly	  lacked. 	  People	  might	  get	  richer	  by	  22associating	  together,	  because	  of	  the	  beneKits	  they	  can	  get	  by	  co-­‐operating,	  but	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  this	  can	  fairly	  be	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  non-­‐members.	  If	  their	  co-­‐operation	  does	  worsen	  the	  situation	  of	  others,	  for	  example,	  if	  their	  activity	  causes	  pollution	  that	  makes	  them	  worse	  off,	  then	  it	  looks	  as	  if	  associates	  have	  a	  special	  obligation	  of	  rectiKicatory	  justice	  towards	  those	  outsiders,	  an	  obligation	  that	  will	  involve	  either	  restoring	  the	  status	  quo	  ante,	  or	  compensating	  them	  for	  their	  losses.	  
If	  association	  does	  not	  alter	  the	  original	  egalitarian	  relationship	  with	  outsiders	  concerning	  resource	  shares,	  what	  about	  the	  relationship	  among	  associates?	  Here	  model	  
When	  I	  say	  that	  the	  new	  associations	  do	  not	  alter	  in	  a	  fundamental	  way	  the	  22relationship	  of	  the	  the	  associates	  to	  outsiders,	  I	  do	  not	  mean	  that	  there	  is	  no	  change.	  In	  fact,	  there	  may	  be	  some	  signiKicant	  changes	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  positive	  duties	  to	  others,	  since	  the	  fact	  of	  association	  may	  give	  associates	  a	  priority	  over	  others	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  duties	  of	  assistance,	  rescue,	  and	  so	  forth.	  This	  is	  central	  to	  the	  case	  Samuel	  SchefKler	  discusses	  of	  the	  ‘distributive	  objection’ to	  associative	  duties.	  See	  his	  ‘Families,	  Nations,	  Strangers’ in	  SchefKler	  (2001).
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theorists	  (at	  least	  those	  whose	  theory	  of	  global	  justice	  has	  a	  relational	  basis	  and	  restricted	  scope)	  have	  often	  argued	  that	  duties	  towards	  other	  associates,	  including	  distributive	  duties,	  are	  more	  demanding	  and	  egalitarian	  than	  those	  towards	  outsiders.	  On	  one	  way	  of	  looking	  at	  the	  matter,	  this	  might	  seem	  surprising.	  It	  might	  be	  that	  we	  should	  see	  less	  egalitarianism	  as	  an	  option,	  simply	  because,	  given	  their	  association,	  people	  might	  use	  their	  moral	  powers	  in	  order	  to	  sanction	  inegalitarian	  norms	  among	  themselves	  that	  they	  would	  have	  no	  right	  to	  impose	  on	  non-­‐associates.	  However,	  we	  must	  not	  assume	  that	  the	  rights	  and	  powers	  that	  get	  people	  associated	  with	  one	  another	  are	  purely	  a	  matter	  of	  voluntary	  choice,	  and	  once	  a	  co-­‐operative	  scheme	  is	  up	  and	  running	  is	  is	  bound	  to	  be	  the	  case	  that	  new	  members	  (by	  birth)	  are	  subjected	  to	  a	  framework	  of	  authority	  or	  coercion	  that	  they	  did	  not	  choose.	  This	  may	  license	  a	  comparatively	  egalitarian	  approach.	  	  
With	  respect	  to	  outsiders,	  the	  important	  question	  is	  going	  to	  be	  how	  the	  initial	  allocation	  of	  resources	  translates	  into	  a	  story	  about	  distributive	  shares	  in	  the	  future,	  once	  co-­‐operative	  associations	  are	  up	  and	  running.	  What	  we	  say	  here	  will	  depend	  on	  whether	  we	  allow	  the	  members	  of	  those	  schemes	  to	  hold	  onto	  the	  wealth	  accumulated	  by	  previous	  generations	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  collective	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  intergenerational	  person,	  with	  a	  capacity	  for	  taking	  responsibility	  for	  its	  actions,	  bequeathing	  its	  assets	  etc, 	  or	  whether	  the	  accumulations	  of	  previous	  generations	  -­‐	  for	  which	  present	  ones	  23are	  not	  responsible	  -­‐	  should	  revert	  to	  a	  global	  commons.	  But	  whichever	  way	  the	  argument	  goes	  on	  that,	  the	  jury	  is	  out	  on	  whether	  institutions	  make	  the	  kind	  of	  
See	  Rawls	  (1999b)	  and	  Miller	  (2007)	  for	  arguments	  in	  support	  of	  such	  claims	  on	  the	  23basis	  the	  importance	  of	  	  the	  collective	  autonomy	  of	  peoples	  and	  the	  need	  to	  allocate	  responsibility	  to	  such	  collectives	  over	  time..
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difference	  that	  model-­‐theorists	  and	  realists	  suppose.	  The	  the	  principle-­‐theorist	  can	  tell	  a	  plausible	  story	  about	  the	  normative	  relationships	  that	  obtain,	  both	  among	  people	  in	  the	  world	  in	  general	  and	  among	  fellow	  members	  of	  associations,	  a	  story	  that	  	  can,	  in	  principle	  be	  constructed	  from	  a	  combination	  of	  general	  principles	  and	  justice	  and	  moral	  rights,	  powers,	  duties	  and	  liabilities	  of	  persons	  to	  associate	  in	  various	  ways	  that	  modify	  their	  moral	  relationships.	  There	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  suppose	  that	  the	  modiKication,	  in	  and	  of	  itself,	  creates	  something	  new	  that	  was	  not	  there	  in	  potentia	  beforehand.	  
Implica0ons	  for	  the	  ‘real	  world’	  
Principle-­‐based	  theories	  as	  realis0c	  ones	  
One	  slightly	  paradoxical	  consequence	  of	  what	  I	  have	  argued	  is	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  some	  sorts	  of	  ‘realism’ and	  some	  sorts	  of	  ‘moralism’ ought	  to	  be	  conceived	  differently	  to	  how	  it	  is	  often	  understood.	  If	  the	  key	  distinction	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  between	  theorists	  who	  are	  concerned	  with	  getting	  at	  the	  truth	  about	  fundamental	  values	  and	  those	  who	  are	  keen	  to	  engage	  more	  closely	  with	  political	  and	  policy	  realities,	  then	  GA	  Cohen	  with	  his	  ‘fact-­‐independent	  principles’,	  Cohen	  (2008)	  and	  Amartya	  Sen	  (2006)	  look	  to	  be	  at	  opposite	  poles	  of	  the	  debate,	  with	  Rawls	  and	  his	  followers	  sitting	  somewhere	  in	  the	  middle,	  and	  the	  model-­‐theoretic	  idea	  of	  a	  ‘realistic	  utopia’ appearing	  to	  be	  some	  sort	  of	  compromise	  between	  the	  purest	  of	  ideals	  and	  grubby	  practicalities.	  But	  actually	  there	  need	  be	  no	  great	  conKlict	  between	  Cohen	  and	  Sen:	  an	  entirely	  practical	  orientation	  can	  be	  informed	  by	  the	  purest	  of	  values:	  if	  we	  conceive	  of	  justice	  as	  requiring	  equality,	  say,	  we	  can	  ask	  ourselves	  which	  policies	  in	  the	  actual	  world	  promote	  that	  value,	  as	  well	  as	  taking	  into	  account	  other	  competing	  values.	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Rawlsian	  constructivism,	  by	  contrast,	  seeks	  to	  deKine	  an	  ideal	  of	  justice	  for	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society,	  for	  a	  realistic	  utopia,	  and	  so	  we	  have	  to	  ask	  ourselves	  a	  whole	  series	  of	  difKicult	  questions,	  Kirst	  deKining	  our	  principles	  according	  to	  what	  would	  be	  workable	  and	  stable	  under	  counterfactual	  conditions	  rather	  distant	  from	  actuality,	  and	  then	  addressing	  what	  we	  ought	  to	  do	  in	  the	  actual	  world	  by	  trying	  to	  relate	  it	  to	  how	  things	  would	  be	  in	  that	  counterfactual	  one.	  It	  is	  not	  obvious	  either	  how	  to	  do	  this,	  or	  how	  to	  relate	  it	  to	  policy.	  If	  the	  business	  of	  thinking	  about	  a	  ‘well-­‐ordered	  society’ is	  merely	  one	  way	  of	  trying	  to	  get	  clear	  about	  what	  our	  basic	  values	  are,	  there	  can	  be	  no	  objection,	  but	  if	  we	  conceive	  of	  it	  as	  being	  deKinitive	  of	  what	  justice	  requires,	  then	  things	  are	  much	  more	  problematic.	  
Model	  theory	  as	  ideology	  
Finally,	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  model-­‐theoretic	  approaches	  that	  try	  to	  deKine	  what	  justice	  requires	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  an	  ideally	  just	  society	  (a	  ‘realistic	  utopia’)	  face	  a	  dilemma	  when	  they	  encounter	  real-­‐world	  policy:	  they	  risk	  either	  irrelevance	  or	  apologetics	  for	  the	  status	  quo.	  We	  could	  even	  talk	  of	  ‘model	  theory	  as	  ideology.’ 	  This	  is	  a	  difKicult	  charge	  to	  24make	  stick	  as	  a	  strict	  implication	  of	  the	  approach,	  but	  I	  believe	  it	  is	  not	  unreasonable	  given	  the	  pragmatics	  of	  political	  argument.	  The	  thought	  is	  that	  principles	  that	  ofKicially	  only	  have	  application	  conditionally,	  in	  ideal	  circumstances,	  get	  translated	  too	  easily	  into	  apologetics	  for	  policy	  in	  non-­‐ideal	  circumstances	  in	  part	  due	  to	  the	  pressure	  not	  to	  appear	  irrelevant	  to	  ‘real	  world’.	  
An	  example	  may	  help	  bring	  this	  out.	  Immigration	  is	  a	  major	  feature	  of	  the	  global	  order,	  so	  any	  theory	  of	  global	  justice	  will	  have	  to	  take	  a	  view	  on	  it,	  and	  particularly	  on	  the	  
I	  am,	  of	  course,	  deliberately	  echoing	  Mills	  (2005).24
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question	  of	  whether	  (or	  under	  what	  circumstances)	  states	  have	  the	  right	  to	  exclude	  would-­‐be	  migrants.	  One	  author	  who	  has	  written	  extensively	  on	  this	  topic	  is	  Christopher	  Heath	  Wellman,	  who	  argues	  that	  legitimate	  states	  have	  the	  discretion	  to	  exclude,	  a	  right	  he	  derives	  from	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  and	  free	  association	  of	  peoples,	  freedom	  of	  association	  including,	  as	  it	  does,	  the	  freedom	  not	  to	  associate.	  So	  what	  does	  Wellman’s	  view	  imply	  for	  real-­‐world	  policy?	  Apparently,	  very	  little.	  After	  all,	  Wellman	  has	  a	  deKinition	  of	  what	  a	  legitimate	  state	  is:	  
‘a	  state	  has	  earned	  legi%macy	  if	  it	  is	  willing	  and	  able	  (a)	  to	  protect	  its	  members	  against	  “substan%al	  and	  
recurrent	  threats” to	  a	  decent	  human	  life	  – threats	  such	  as	  the	  arbitrary	  depriva%on	  of	  life	  or	  liberty,	  and	  the	  
inﬂic%on	  of	  torture	  – and	  (b)	  to	  refrain	  from	  imposing	  such	  threats	  on	  outsiders’. 	  25
Looking	  at	  this	  test	  of	  legitimacy,	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  a	  state's	  right	  to	  exclude,	  it	  is	  quite	  possible	  to	  reach	  the	  conclusion	  that	  hardly	  any	  countries	  meet	  it.	  Some	  perhaps	  do.	  Maybe	  the	  Scandinavian	  countries	  and	  Canada,	  possibly	  Uruguay,	  have	  a	  good	  enough	  human	  rights	  record.	  A	  country	  such	  as	  the	  United	  States	  presents	  a	  much	  more	  difKicult	  case,	  as	  critics	  will	  point	  to	  evidence	  of	  a	  dysfunctional	  and	  racist	  justice	  and	  carceral	  system	  at	  home	  and	  America's	  record	  of	  torture	  and	  drone	  strikes	  overseas.	  What	  does	  Wellman	  himself	  think?	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  know.	  If	  he	  were	  to	  agree	  with	  the	  negative	  assessment	  of	  US	  legitimacy,	  it	  would	  follow	  that	  he	  could	  not	  endorse	  the	  freedom	  of	  association	  argument	  for	  the	  right	  to	  exclude	  in	  that	  case.	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  easy	  to	  imagine	  that	  readers,	  even	  not	  particularly	  casual	  ones,	  who	  are	  sympathetic	  to	  states'	  rights	  to	  control	  their	  borders	  will	  conclude,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  idealised	  representation	  of	  freedom	  of	  association,	  that	  actual	  states,	  which	  do	  not	  technically	  meet	  the	  legitimacy	  test,	  enjoy	  the	  exclusionary	  right.	  
I’ve	  taken	  this	  deKinition	  from	  his	  book	  with	  Andrew	  Altman,	  Altman	  and	  Wellman	  25(2009),	  p.4,	  but	  similar	  formulations	  occur	  in,	  for	  example,	  his	  Wellman	  (2008).
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One	  could	  Kind	  similar	  slippages	  in	  the	  work	  of	  other	  people	  who	  work	  in	  a	  model-­‐theoretic	  way.	  Ronald	  Dworkin’s	  theory	  of	  equality	  of	  resources	  appears	  to	  issue	  policy	  prescriptions	  under	  very	  restricted	  and	  ideal	  circumstances,	  but	  his	  work	  also	  contains	  very	  concrete	  prescriptions	  on,	  say,	  welfare	  and	  unemployment	  beneKits,	  that	  seem	  to	  require	  holding	  people	  responsible	  for	  their	  actions	  in	  the	  real	  world	  in	  a	  way	  that	  the	  austere	  version	  of	  the	  theory	  ought	  to	  disclaim. 	  26
Conclusion	  
The	  primary	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  has	  been	  to	  mark	  some	  distinctions	  among	  different	  methodological	  approaches	  to	  justice	  and	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  dividing	  lines	  may	  not	  be	  in	  quite	  the	  positions	  that	  partisans	  of	  one	  approach	  or	  another	  think.	  ‘Taking	  institutions	  seriously’ does	  not	  mark	  a	  divide	  between	  realism	  and	  moralism,	  but	  cuts	  within	  the	  moralist	  camp	  between	  what	  I	  call	  model-­‐based	  and	  principle-­‐based	  theories,	  the	  former	  of	  which	  accords	  institutions	  -­‐	  at	  least	  in	  an	  idealised	  form	  -­‐	  	  a	  constitutive	  role	  for	  principles	  of	  justice.	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  sound	  a	  sceptical	  note,	  however,	  about	  whether	  institutions	  should	  play	  this	  role,	  suggesting	  that	  principle-­‐based	  theories,	  which	  try	  to	  derive	  what	  justice	  requires	  from	  non-­‐institutional	  principles,	  may	  be	  able	  to	  account	  for	  how	  institutions	  make	  a	  difference	  whilst	  denying	  models	  a	  constitutive	  role	  for	  principles	  of	  justice	  as	  such.	  Finally,	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  arguments	  that	  draw	  on	  idealised	  models	  of	  society	  may	  play	  an	  ideological	  role	  in	  legitimating	  principles	  that	  ought	  not	  to	  apply	  in	  the	  actual	  world.	  	  	  
	  Dworkin	  (2000)	  on	  which	  see	  Armstrong	  (2005)	  for	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  this	  26point.
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